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REDEFINING THE AMERICAN COASTLINE: CAN
THE GOVERNMENT WITHDRAW BASIC
SERVICES FROM THE COAST AND AVOID
TAKINGS CLAIMS?
Travis Martay Brennan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Herodotus once said “[t]his is the worst pain a man can have: to know
much and have no power to act.”1 The words of Herodotus resonate today
in the debate over the habitability of the coast. Despite advances in technology and science, which have provided government and citizens alike with
the knowledge of the physical and financial dangers of coastal development, society has lost control over the ability to limit and discourage
development in coastal areas that are repeatedly subject to disaster. The
cavalier and defiant spirit of American culture has led us to encourage and
subsidize growth at the foot of our own Mount Vesuvius thereby leading
to a perpetual reenactment of the same disaster.
Hurricanes, floods, and coastal erosion are not new phenomena;
however, the toll of these natural disasters on humans has been exacerbated
by increased development and human habitation along the coast.2 In
essence, coastal communities represent the quintessential conflict between
humans and nature. Many local and state governments have sought to

*. University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2009. The author would like to thank
reference librarian Julie Welch and professors Laura Underkuffler, James Friedman, and
David Owen for their help and encouragement.
1. HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES 504 (John M. Marincola ed., Aubrey De Selincourt
trans., Penguin Books 1996) (1954).
2. INS. INFO. INST., RESIDUAL MARKET P ROPERTY PLANS: FROM MARKETS OF LAST
RESORT TO MARKETS OF FIRST CHOICE 8-9 (2007) (stating that fifty-three percent of nation’s
153 million people lived in coastal communities in 2003). Between 1980 and 2003, the
population of coastal counties grew by twenty-eight percent, which was equivalent to 33
million people. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HURRICANE ANDREW: SOUTH
FLORIDA AND LOUISIANA, at iii (1993).
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promote coastal development as a means to generate economic prosperity
by expanding the tax base and increasing employment opportunities.3 Both
the governments that have promoted such growth and the private citizens
that have a proprietary or other financial interest in these areas have an
incentive to protect their interests.4 This translates into harnessing modern
technology to preserve coastal property damaged by natural events.5 Thus,
many coastal communities have a cyclical life existence.6 First, the coastal
community is created. Second, the coastal community is damaged or
destroyed by a natural event.7 Third, the coastal community is reborn as
disaster relief is provided and repairs are made.

3. See NANCY S. PHILIPPI, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT—ECOLOGIC AND ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 29-30 (1996) (describing numerous economic and ecological interests
associated with coastal communities).
4. See id. at 30.
5. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING COASTAL EROSION 29, 35, 56-61 (1990)
(describing prominent human methods used to combat coastal flooding and erosion such as
creation and use of inlets, jetties, dredged entrances, dams, groins, seawalls and revetments,
breakwaters, and beach nourishment plans).
6. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 63 (1985) (noting that flood damages have repeatedly failed
to temper coastal encroachment and development). Dauphin Island, Alabama provides a
quintessential example of the cyclical existence of coastal communities. The island has been
destroyed five times by hurricanes in the past twenty-five years. Rob Young & Andrew
Coburn, Editorial, Let Free Market Lash Beach Towns, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 2007,
at A19. Despite the fact that Hurricane Katrina destroyed the island’s vacation homes,
investment properties, and infrastructure when it moved the island a hundred feet, rebuilding
has commenced. Id. According to Rob Young and Andrew Coburn, who teach at Western
Carolina University, “[i]f history is any guide, most of this new development will last only
a few years” before it is destroyed. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, in 2004 Hurricane Ivan destroyed County Road 399, a two-lane road in
Florida, which serves as the access road to the Gulf Islands National Seashore. Kari C.
Barlow, CR 399 Repairs Delayed, NW. FLA. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2005, at C1. Again, ten
months later, Hurricane Dennis destroyed the road, and the federal government set aside $21
million for reconstruction efforts. Id.
Lastly, Hurricane Fran dismantled hundreds of beachfront homes and destroyed
critical infrastructure when it struck along the North Carolina coast in 1996. Stuart
Leavenworth & Todd Richissin, Fran Rearranges Not Only Coastline but Also Development
Debate, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 22, 1996, at 1A. On North Topsail Island, the North
Carolina Department of Transportation estimated that it would cost $500,000 to repair a road
that had been repeatedly damaged. Id. According to the Department, the state had spent
$4.2 million since 1980 to repair the same road from storm damage. Id. In other areas of
the state such as Wrightsville Beach, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Army
Corps) had spent more than $10 million since 1980 to replenish the beach with sand. Id.
7. The term “natural event” is used throughout the paper to refer to floods, hurricanes,
and coastal erosion. The term is slightly broader than natural disaster because it
encompasses coastal erosion.
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This cyclical pattern—creation, destruction, and repair—embodies the
life of many American coastal communities. The resources spent at the
federal, state, and local level that contribute to the coastal community lifecycle are staggering.8 While the federal government spends billions of
dollars to fund agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA),9 which runs programs like the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP), state and local governments are left to cover the shortfalls
in federal disaster relief expenditures.10 This cycle is repeated because in
today’s political climate it is considered outrageous to refuse to rebuild a
coastal community after a natural event.11 Imagine the outcry had political
leaders decreed that New Orleans would not be rebuilt after Hurricane
Katrina.
This Comment posits that the coastal community lifecycle will be
broken in the future as a new coastal community ethic and corresponding
public policy agenda emerge in response to the effects of climate change
and society’s internalization of the costs of rebuilding coastal communities.
This ethic will embrace the belief that living along the coast, to a certain
extent, is an individual choice and that the costs and responsibilities
associated with that choice should be borne by the individual rather than
the government.
Moreover, this Comment explores the ways in which a new coastal
community ethic will redefine the American coastline, asserting that one
approach governments may use to minimize coastal costs is to withdraw
basic services like utilities and road repair projects from coastal
communities. The question that then arises is whether the government can
change its public policy for free. If the government refused to rebuild a
coastal community’s infrastructure would property owners be entitled to
compensation for a “taking” of their property under either the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments? After analyzing landowners’ takings claims, this
Comment concludes that the government can change its coastal community

8. DENNIS MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN
UNITED STATES 72-73, 77 (1999) (stating that between 1975 and 1994 flood-related
property damage was between $19.6 and $196 billion while hurricane related property
damage for same period was $11 billion to $111 billion).
9. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RESPONDING TO NATURAL DISASTERS 137, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/dhs.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2008) [hereinafter DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.] (stating FEMA had a budget of $3.1 billion
in fiscal year 2007).
10. See PHILIPPI, supra note 3, at 68-70 (describing state and local government
involvement in managing floodplains).
11. Id. at 110 (explaining influence that flood victims have over political leaders).
THE
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public policy without compensating landowners. The legal explanation,
however, may differ from the political one.12
Part I of this Comment provides a brief historical overview of coastal
property damage, describes the financial costs associated with natural
disasters along the coastline, and discusses the extent of coastal development in the United States. Part II explains the major causes that have led
to explosive coastal development, including perceived technological
advances in protecting coastal property and social policies such as the
National Flood Insurance Program. Part III discusses the factors that may
change the traditional coastal community lifecycle, such as climate change
and the internalization of costs associated with maintaining coastal communities. Part IV explores whether the government could withdraw basic
services from the coast and refuse to rebuild damaged infrastructure
without compensating landowners. Although the government may not have
to compensate landowners with legal damages, it would likely have to
appropriate funds to garner political support for this policy change. Part V
concludes that the government’s refusal to rebuild coastal communities’
infrastructure is a powerful, economically efficient tool that could be used
to reshape the American coastline.
I. COASTAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY FLOODS AND HURRICANES:
A FAMILIAR SIGHT
A. General Overview
Although Hurricane Katrina is at the forefront of peoples’ memory,
Hurricane Camille, which caused similar devastation thirty-five years
earlier in 1969, has largely been forgotten.13 The devastating damages
inflicted by hurricanes are not a new phenomenon.14 Between 1921 and

12. Currently, there is no case law directly on point that might suggest a resolution to
these questions. The absence of case law reflects the fact that all levels of government
currently spend enormous sums of money to rebuild coastal communities after natural events
thereby eliminating these potential claims.
13. See WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING: THE
DROWNING OF AMERICA’S SHORELINE 138-39 (1983).
14. DAVID M. BUSH, ORRIN H. PILKEY JR. & WILLIAM J. NEAL, LIVING BY THE RULES OF
THE SEA 1 (1996). The following list offers a brief synopsis of some of the major hurricanes
in the twentieth century and the financial costs: Great Miami Hurricane (1926), $760 million
in damage in 2004 dollars; Hurricane Hazel (1954), $280 million; Hurricane Betsy (1965),
$1 billion; Hurricane Frederic (1979), $2.3 billion; Hurricane Hugo (1989), $7 billion; and
Hurricane Andrew (1992), $25 billion. Id.

2008]

Redefining the American Coastline

105

1960, 170 storms battered the Atlantic Coast.15 Sensationalized accounts
of flood and hurricane disasters by the media have led the public to
perceive major disasters as “acts of God.”16 The act of God mentality
allows people to view their experiences as isolated events.17 Moreover,
media coverage following a natural event often glorifies irrational decisions
by portraying local residents as stubborn and steadfast.18 Such naiveté
toward the power of nature led Wallace Kaufman and Orrin Pilkey to draw
an analogy between tragic scenes in silent films and horrific natural
disasters:
In silent films and cartoons there is a classic scene in which the
heroine is tied to a railroad track and the train is coming. Time and
again she escapes. This scene is reenacted in reality by ordinary
people, whose numbers are a thousandfold greater than those of the
film heroes. The Gulf Coast and the Atlantic Seaboard are the
railroad tracks, and the trains are hurricanes and winter storms.
Instead of people tied to tracks, there are houses and possessions.
The owners, banks, and insurance companies have tied the knots
by refusing to allow homeowners to move or abandon damaged
homes. Unfortunately, once the storm has come and gone,
sympathy focuses our attention on the victim and we forget how
she came to be tied on the tracks.19
Governments have an obligation to provide relief to those harmed by
natural events; however, governments also have a corresponding duty to
society to examine the factors that create disasters. The government often
upholds its former obligation while neglecting the latter.
B. The Growth of Coastal Communities and the
Corresponding Costs of Natural Events
The staggering losses experienced by coastal communities, frequently
associated with floods and hurricanes, have increased alongside the
growing percentage of the population with some connection to the coast.20

15. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 13, at 134.
16. Id. at 114.
17. See id. at 137. In a study conducted by Toronto geographers ninety percent of the
people interviewed indicated that they had personally experienced a storm, but only twothirds expected to experience more storms in the future. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 132.
20. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 16.
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Eighty-five percent of the nation’s population is concentrated in the thirty
states that have a coastline.21 Among those states with coastlines there are
a total of 451 coastal counties.22 The number of people living within one
of these coastal counties increased from eighty million in 1960, to 110
million in 1990.23 Additionally, the population growth in areas within five
miles of the shoreline has outpaced population growth in other areas by
three times the national average.24
As the population of coastal communities has increased so too have the
costs related to flood and hurricane damage. Floods in the United States
are the source of the greatest loss of life and property damage among all
types of natural disasters during the twentieth century.25 While the number
of deaths from floods between 1975 and 1994 was between 1,600 and
2,310,26 the property losses for that same period were between $19.6 billion
and $196 billion.27 Although hurricanes are less deadly than floods—
registering 173 deaths between 1975 and 1994—they still account for
property damages between $11 billion and $111 billion.28
While damages may be recouped by property owners from a myriad of
sources, FEMA alone expended $2.8 billion between 1989 and 1994 for
disasters such as floods and hurricanes.29 Moreover, the federal govern-

21. Id. (stating that out of eighty-five percent of people who live in states with coastline,
fifty-three percent live in fifty-mile wide range of coast); see also INS. INFO. INST., supra
note 2, at 8-9 (stating that fifty-three percent of country’s population of 153 million people
live in coastal county).
22. BUSH ET AL., supra note 14, at 5.
23. Id; see also INS. INFO. INST., supra note 2, at 8-9 (offering similar findings in growth
of coastal counties); Cornelia Dean, Some Experts Say It’s Time to Evacuate the Coast (for
Good), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at F4 [hereinafter Some Experts Say It’s Time to Evacuate
the Coast] (describing growth of coastal communities).
24. BUSH ET AL., supra note 14, at 5.
25. CHARLES A. PERRY, SIGNIFICANT FLOODS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 20TH
CENTURY—USGS MEASURES A CENTURY OF FLOODS 25 (2000).
26. MILETI, supra note 8, at 72 (reporting an average of seventy-eight deaths per year
between 1925 and 1988).
27. Id. (stating that sum of crop and property losses between 1975 and 1994 was
between $27.7 billion and $277 billion).
28. Id. at 76-77. Hurricane Katrina, which effected a 90,000 square mile area (equivalent
to the size of Great Britain), resulted in the evacuation of 1.5 million people and the damage
or destruction of 200,000 homes. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 9, at 135. Over
$80 billion has been made available for response and recovery efforts. Id.; see also Mark
Schleifstein, Focus on Rebuilding, Not Blame, FEMA Says; Official Says More Money Is
on the Way, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 28, 2007, at Metro 1 (stating that FEMA
has allocated more than $8.3 billion in funds to be used in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
and Texas for clean-up and reconstruction projects).
29. MILETI, supra note 8, at 72.
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ment spent $2.5 billion between 1978 and 1990 for flood losses that were
covered under the NFIP.30 Private insurance companies, however, spent
between $35 billion and $41 billion for losses associated with floods.31
C. Conclusion
History has forewarned coastal communities of their precarious
existence. Lives are lost and property is damaged when hurricanes and
floods strike coastal communities. Despite repeated warnings, our coastal
communities have continued to grow at astounding rates. Consequently,
the federal government, along with local and state governments and private
insurers, has carried a greater burden to provide a safety net for those that
suffer losses.
II. CAUSES OF COASTAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Economic Factors
Historically, floodplains were developed because the land was fertile
and productive for farmers.32 Floodplains also provided both shipping
access, critical to commerce, and a place to draw water and dispose of
waste.33 Over time, these historical explanations for coastal development
shifted. Today, local governments benefit from coastal development
because it expands the local tax base34 and increases tourism and employment.35 Private landowners benefit from development through increased
property values.36 With high property values and tax revenues at stake,

30. Id. at 73.
31. Id.; see also INS. INFO. INST., supra note 2, at 2, 4 (stating that exposure to loss in Fair
Access to Insurance (FAIR) Plans, which are those that provide property insurance from
residual market, increased from $40.2 billion in 1990 to $387.8 billion in 2005). In 2004,
one study by AIR Worldwide found that the value of insured coastal property in those states
bordering the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico amounted to $6.86 trillion. Id. at 9.
32. PHILIPPI, supra note 3, at 29.
33. Id.
34. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 13, at 226.
35. Id., supra note 13, at 226.
36. See Vivian Marino, Water, Water, Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at F1
(stating that popular locations for buyers include California; South Florida; South Padre
Island, Texas; Holden Beach, North Carolina; the Outer Banks, North Carolina; and Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina. According to David Hehman, chief executive of EscapeHomes.com,
“[y]ou’re going to pay a 25 percent premium for a view and a 50 percent to be on the water.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Hehman believes that the national average price for an
oceanfront home is nearly $1 million. Id.
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coastal communities have strong incentives to protect property and to
promote growth. Consequently, many “local building departments are
often unable or unwilling to keep pace with code enforcement—even if
there is an adequate code to enforce.”37
B. Technology and the Illusions of Safety
According to renowned environmentalists Wallace Kaufman and Orrin
Pilkey, Jr., coastal development is often premised on the assumption that
humans have the technology to minimize and control the effects of nature:
“Perhaps as a nation we are too traditionally optimistic, confident of avoiding or conquering all disasters. We choose to stand, express ourselves
freely in our development, and fight the natural forces with our engineering
genius.”38 This “engineering genius”39 has led to the development and
application of a number of human devices to “protect” and “preserve”
coastal communities.40 Engineering solutions fall generally under one of
two categories: either (1) hard stabilization, like seawalls and groins;41 or
(2) soft stabilization like beach replenishment.42

37. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at iv.
38. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 13, at 113.
39. Id.
40. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 2.
41. ORRIN H. PILKEY & KATHARINE L. DIXON, THE CORPS AND THE SHORE 38 (1996);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 56-59 (1990). In Louisiana, Route 82 was
frequently washed away in storms. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 13, at 49. This led the
Army Corp to spend several million dollars to construct a four-mile-long seawall along the
beach. Id. At Camp Ellis, Maine, the Army Corps constructed jetties on the north side of
the Saco River mouth (1867) and the south side (1891) to preserve a sandy port, which was
important to the textile industry. P ILKEY & DIXON, supra at 174, 175. On Grand Isle in
Louisiana, the Army Corps constructed a jetty and a seawall in 1976 because coastal
developments were destroyed on several occasions and homeowners could not be convinced
to setback their houses. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 13, at 99-100.
42. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 56-59. Beginning in the late 1960s and
early 1970s a movement from hard stabilization to soft stabilization occurred, which led
some states, including North Carolina and Maine, to ban permanent hard stabilization
structures. DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION: RECASTING
DISASTER POLICY AND PLANNING 33 (1999). Since this shift, beach replenishment has
become a popular means to mitigate coastal erosion and flood damage. Id. Beach
replenishment is the process by which sand is used either to directly fill a targeted area or
to occasionally supplement a beach where sand has been lost. See R.W.G. CARTER,
COASTAL ENVIRONMENTS 459 (1988). Beach replenishment has been used extensively along
the East Coast to preserve beaches in Atlantic City, New Jersey; Coney Island, New York;
Ocean City, Maryland; Virginia Beach, Virginia; Jacksonville Beach, Florida; and Miami
Beach, Florida. PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 41, at 75. By 1987, approximately 400 million
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The use of hard and soft stabilization strategies to mitigate coastal
erosion and flooding has adverse effects. In addition to ruining the natural
aesthetic of the shoreline, hard stabilization structures can exacerbate
coastal erosion and destroy beaches “by providing a stationary object
against which a retreating beach narrows and eventually disappears.”43
Although soft stabilization methods are more aesthetically attractive, they
are costly,44 ecologically dangerous, and often ineffective.45 Despite the
adverse consequences associated with mitigation techniques, local
governments and private landowners continue to advocate for their use.46
Hard and soft stabilization strategies may provide relatively quick fixes, but
these approaches do not represent enduring solutions.47 One study
conducted along the shoreline of Lake Ontario found that in ten years over
seventy percent of hard stabilization structures were damaged and after
thirty years that number increased to ninety-six percent.48
C. The National Flood Insurance Act and the Encouragement of
Coastal Growth
After a number of costly floods struck different parts of the country in
the 1960s, Congress and the President commissioned national studies to
explore the possibility of subsidized flood insurance.49 In 1968, the
National Flood Insurance Act was passed50 with the belief that a system of
subsidized flood insurance could “promote the public interest by providing
appropriate protection against the perils of flood losses and encouraging

cubic yards of sand were distributed among 400 miles of shoreline in the United States. Id.
at 78. As a point of reference to comprehend the magnitude of this sand distribution, one
should consider that 680,000 cubic yards of sand is enough to fill several football stadiums
to the top of the stands. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 13, at 29.
43. PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 41, at 40.
44. Id. at 78-79 (stating that by 1995 total national costs for replenishment projects were
between $4 and $5 billion).
45. Id. at 369 (citing study of a beach renourishment project along Wrightsville Beach
in North Carolina, which found that between fifty-four and sixty-two percent of beach fill
was lost within year).
46. Most recently, the Army Corps’ proposals to protect the Gulf Coast from future
hurricanes and floods have come under attack from scientists. Cornelia Dean, Corps
Proposal for Gulf Draws Criticism from Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2006, at F2.
47. See CARTER, supra note 42, at 439 (“Very few remedial solutions have design lives
of more than 40-50 years . . . .”).
48. Id. at 450.
49. See GODSCHALK ET AL., supra note 42, at 31.
50. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1303(c), 82 Stat. 572
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (2000)).
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sound land use by minimizing exposure of property to flood losses.”51 A
nationally subsidized system was necessary, according to Congress,
because “many factors have made it uneconomic for the private insurance
industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such
protection on reasonable terms and conditions.”52
FEMA, however, did not assume management control over disaster
relief and the NFIP until Executive Order 12,127 was issued in 1979.53
Under the NFIP, FEMA maps flood hazards54 and identifies communities
that may qualify for subsidized insurance.55 FEMA uses Flood Hazard
Boundary Maps (FHBM) to designate areas that are at risk of floods.56 If
a community qualifies, FEMA provides them with minimum land use
standards for the development and location of structures, which must be
implemented to attain subsidized insurance.57 If a community adopts
FEMA’s standards, FEMA then promulgates flood insurance policies and
rates for residents of that community.58 The NFIP has expanded rapidly
and today covers 4.5 million properties, representing $500 billion in
coverage.59
While the NFIP had good intentions, in practice, it has offered coastal
communities all carrot and no stick. First, the NFIP has subsidized
development along the coast that would not otherwise have been feasible.60

51. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c)(1) (2006).
52. Id. § 4001(b)(1).
53. PHILIPPI, supra note 3, at 54.
54. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2007) (defining Flood Hazard Boundary Map (FHBM) as official
map created by National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Administrator that designates
special hazard areas).
55. See Christine M. McMillan, Comment, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making
Matters Worse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 475, 480 (2007).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a) (describing floodplain as land in community that is “subject to
a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding in a given year”).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4012(c)(2), 4102(c); see also 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(3); Christine A.
Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural
Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1491 (2007).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a); McMillan, supra note 55, at 481. The NFIP “covers up to
$250,000 per event for a residential structure.” Id. at 489.
59. McMillan, supra note 55, at 493. In 1979, the NFIP had more than 1.8 million
policies in force and by 2001 this number had increased to nearly 4.5 million. FEMA,
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINANCIAL AND STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM 14
(2001).
60. McMillan, supra note 55, at 499-500; see also CARTER, supra note 42, at 369. The
NFIP has been criticized for subsidizing insurance in disaster-prone areas, which “bribes
people to scorn common sense, damages the environment, and creates staggering liabilities
for taxpayers.” James Bovard, Uncle Sam’s Flood Machine, THE FREEMAN, Jan./Feb. 2006,
at 36; see also Charlie Crist, Editorial, The Politics of Disaster, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2007,
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Second, FEMA has little control over enforcement of local ordinances and
compliance.61 Third, the premiums paid by policyholders under the NFIP
do not correspond to the risks of living in coastal areas.62 The premium
rates under the NFIP are based on an average of expected losses for a
year.63 These rates are lower than what private insurers would charge
because they fail to incorporate the risks of catastrophic losses.64 Thus, the
premiums charged by the NFIP are insufficient “to build loss reserves
necessary to cover potential losses from a catastrophic loss year, or
potentially even a series of years with high successive losses.”65 While the
NFIP grosses about $2.2 billion in premiums, it was faced with $22 billion
in claims in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina struck.66 Finally, the NFIP
provides subsidized insurance to property owners, which is far below the
cost of similar private insurance.67 Therefore, growth in disaster-prone
areas is encouraged because people do not have to internalize the costs of
living in floodplains.
D. Conclusion
A combination of market forces, technological developments, and
government incentives have spurred coastal development. These factors
have been responsible for perpetuating the coastal community lifecycle.
Although such factors help to explain the current predicament surrounding
coastal communities, these factors are not determinative of their future.

at A20 (stating that insurance subsidies essentially transfer risk from coastal homeowners
to taxpayers, encouraging homeowners to stay in disaster-prone areas).
61. McMillan, supra note 55, at 501; see also Houck, supra note 6, at 157. In United
States v. Parish of St. Bernard, FEMA brought suit against a Louisiana parish for failure to
enforce flood mitigation methods agreed upon under the NFIP. 756 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th
Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit held that the NFIP did not create contractual obligations
between communities participating in the NFIP and the United States. Id. This holding
substantially undermined FEMA’s ability to punish a community’s noncompliance.
McMillan, supra note 55, at 501-02.
62. See McMillan, supra note 55, at 503.
63. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 334 (2003).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 334-35.
66. See McMillan, supra note 55, at 495-96; see also John K. Warren, Restoring
Responsibility and Accountability in Disaster Relief, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 893, 907 (2007).
67. Barnhizer, supra note 63, at 333.
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III. THE POTENTIAL EVOLUTION OF THE COASTAL
COMMUNITY LIFECYCLE
A. Climate Change: A Transformative Force
Political, economic, and social factors have shaped our society’s belief
that the coast is an inhabitable place. While our beliefs have contributed
to the coastal community lifecycle, change and the development of a new
coastal ethic is possible in the future. Climate change and the physical and
economic costs associated with it are becoming too great for individuals
and governments to dismiss. Our society will likely have to physically and
cognitively adapt to the effects of climate change.68
Although some rogue scientists dismiss the severity of climate
change,69 there is overwhelming consensus among the scientific community
that climate change poses a serious threat to humanity.70 Between 1995 and
2006, the world recorded eleven of the twelve warmest years since global
surface temperatures began being recorded in 1850.71 Consequently,
substantial sea level increases have occurred between 1961 and 2003 as
glaciers, ice caps, and ice sheets melt.72 Specifically, between 1961 and
1992, the sea level rose an average of 1.8 mm/yr; however, between 1993
and 2003, this rate increased to an average of 3.1 mm/yr.73 Rising sea
levels are consistent with analysis of satellite data by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1978, which shows a decrease in the

68. See CARTER, supra note 42, at 557 (“The potential economic and environmental
damage from secular sea-level rise is frightening, certainly billions of dollars will be
involved.”).
69. See generally Ross Gelbspan, The Heat is On: The Warming of the World’s Climate
Sparks a Blaze of Denial, HARPER’S MAG. 82, Dec. 1995; see also The Myth of Global
Warming, http://www.ourcivilisation.com/aginatur/moregw.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
70. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC (2007)] (“Of the more
than 29,000 observational data series, from 75 studies, that show significant change in many
physical and biological systems, more than 89% are consistent with the direction of change
expected as a response to warming.”).
71. Id. at 2. The report provides further context to understand the extent of warm
temperatures over the last fifty years: “[a]verage Northern Hemisphere temperatures during
the second half of the 20th century were very likely higher than during any other 50-year
period in the last 500 years and likely the highest in at least the past 1300 years.” Id.; see
e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, at 5
(1996) [hereinafter IPCC (1996)] (reaching similar conclusions).
72. IPCC (2007), supra note 70, at 2; see also ORRIN H. PILKEY, A CELEBRATION OF THE
WORLD’S BARRIER ISLANDS 43 (2003); IPCC (1996), supra note 71, at 6.
73. IPCC (2007), supra note 70, at 2; see generally IPCC (1996), supra note 71, at 4.
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amount of annual average Arctic sea ice by 2.7 [2.1 to 3.3]% per decade.74
Conservative estimates assume that the sea level will increase an average
of two feet per century, but other reports suggest increases by as much as
fifteen feet by 2200.75 This is particularly concerning because rising sea
levels also cause land above sea level to erode fifty to 200 feet for every
foot of sea level rise.76 A report in 2000 by the Heinz Center for Science,
Economics and Environment, which looked at the impact of rising sea
levels along the United States coast, found that a quarter of all houses
within 500 feet of the coast could be lost by 2060 due to rising sea levels.77
As temperatures and sea levels rise, coastal communities will be
threatened by flooding and more volatile and extreme weather.78 The IPCC
found that between 1900 and 2005, eastern regions of North America
experienced substantial increases in precipitation.79 A further study just
released by Environment America found that New England experienced a
sixty-one percent increase in the number of big storms over the past sixty
years.80
Human-created fossil fuel emissions are one of the driving forces
behind climate change.81 The IPPC projects that between 2000 and 2030,

74. IPCC (2007), supra note 70, at 1.
75. James G. Titus, Does the U.S. Government Realize That the Sea is Rising? How to
Restructure Federal Programs So That Wetlands and Beaches Survive, 30 GOLDEN GATE
U.L.REV. 717, 718 (2000); see generally Mark Stallworthy, Sustainability, Coastal Erosion
and Climate Change: An Environmental Justice Analysis, 18 J. ENVTL. L. 357, 361 (2006).
Rising sea levels stand to exacerbate coastal erosion. DANIEL SAREWITZ, ROGER PIELKE &
RADFORD BYERLY, PREDICTION: SCIENCE, DECISION MAKING, AND THE FUTURE OF NATURE
159 (2000).
76. Titus, supra note 75, at 732-33.
77. Cornelia Dean, Next Victim of Warming: The Beaches, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2006,
at F1 [hereinafter Next Victim of Warming]; Some Experts Say It’s Time to Evacuate the
Coast, supra note 23, at F4. Coastal erosion, which has been exacerbated by human
activities and rising sea-levels spawned by glacial melting is another force that threatens
coastal communities. See STANLEY R. RIGGS & DOROTHEA V. AMES, DROWNING THE NORTH
CAROLINA COAST: SEA-LEVEL RISE AND ESTUARINE DYNAMICS 147 (2003). One study
conducted in North Carolina found that approximately 629 acres of land that was included
in the 1593 miles observed in the study were lost each year. Id. at 146. Although the loss
was distributed throughout a large area of land, “the cumulative effects of the loss rate
through time represent an inevitable and significant change to both North Carolina’s coastal
system and individual property owners.” Id.
78. See IPCC (2007), supra note 70, at 9-12.
79. Id. at 2.
80. John Richardson, Group Blames Warming for Maine Storm, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Dec. 6, 2007, at A1.
81. IPCC (2007), supra note 70, at 5. Since the industrial age in the 1750s, the increased
concentration of greenhouse gas and aerosols is largely responsible for the acceleration of
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carbon dioxide emissions will increase by twenty-five to ninety percent.82
If green house gases are admitted into the earth’s atmosphere at this rate,
additional warming will occur and the consequences will be more
detrimental than those experienced in the twentieth century.83 The earth
would continue warming for the next century even if all emissions ended
tomorrow.84 The prospect of limiting the damage from climate change
through reducing green house gas emissions is grim.
Climate change predictions pose serious questions concerning the role
of government in subsidizing continued costs associated with coastal
communities. As damages to coastal communities increase due to rising
sea levels, floods, coastal erosion, and hurricanes, a new dialogue has the
potential to transpire around two central questions: (1) should certain
coastal communities be rebuilt after repeated damage or destruction; and
(2) if coastal communities should be rebuilt, who should bear the costs?
B. Tension within Governments
Although federal tax dollars are used to subsidize flood insurance,
provide disaster relief, and repair damaged infrastructure,85 local and state

climate change. Id.; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC
SECOND ASSESSMENT CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, at 3 (1996) [hereinafter IPCC (1995)]. Findings
by the IPCC show that “global GHG [green house gas] emissions due to human activities have
grown since pre-industrial times, with an increase of 70% between 1970 and 2004.” IPCC
(2007), supra note 70, at 5; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
SAFEGUARDING THE OZONE LAYER AND THE GLOBAL CLIMATE SYSTEM: ISSUES RELATED TO
HYDROFLUOROCARBONS AND PERFLUOROCARBONS 5 (2005). Carbon dioxide is the most
significant anthropogenic green house gas, and emissions have increased by eighty percent
between 1970 and 2004. IPCC (2007), supra note 70, at 5. The concentration of greenhouse
gasses “are higher [today] than at any time in at least the past six hundred and fifty thousand
years.” Michael Specter, Big Foot: In Measuring Carbon Emissions, It’s Easy to Confuse
Morality and Science, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 2008, at 44.
82. IPCC (2007), supra note 70, at 7.
83. Id. Even if carbon dioxide emissions were reduced to 1994 levels “they would lead
to a nearly constant rate of increase in atmospheric concentrations for at least two centuries.”
IPCC (1995), supra note 81, at 3.
84. Specter, supra note 81, at 46. In order to actually minimize the devastating effects
of climate change, the world would have to prevent increases in emissions for the next
decade and then “reduce them by at least sixty to eighty per cent [sic] by the middle of the
century.” Id.
85. BUSH ET AL., supra note 14, at 3. Currently, federal taxpayers contribute to coastal
communities through underwriting disaster assistance and the NFIP. Id. Federal tax dollars
are used to rebuild and replace communities’ infrastructure, subsidize loans to businesses,
and provide temporary housing for those who are displaced. Id. Federal tax dollars are also
used to support efforts by the Army Corps to rebuild beaches and to construct coastal
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communities are often required to expend considerable resources for
similar activities.86 Generally, federal tax dollars subsidize seventy-five
percent of the costs associated with public infrastructure and other damage
caused by a disaster, but states and local municipalities have to provide
matching funds.87 Disputes frequently arise between states and the federal
government over the exact amount of reimbursements.88 Even when
disaster relief is disbursed by the federal government, state and local
governments are responsible for a portion of the costs associated with
repairs to infrastructure. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act of 1988,89 the federal government subsidizes
repairs for local governments’ infrastructure;90 however, local govern-

defenses such as seawalls. Id. A recent study found that those living in closer proximity to
the coast support taxpayer property insurance subsidies while sixty-three percent of those
from interior counties and non-coastal states believe that the same subsidies are unfair. INS.
INFO. INST., supra note 2, at 12.
86. See Emerging from Isabel: A Review of FEMA’s Preparation for and Response to
Affected Areas in the Hampton Roads Region: Hearing before H. Comm. on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. 14 (2003) (testimony of Eric Tolbert, Director, Response Division,
Federal Emergency Management Agency) [hereinafter Emerging from Isabel].
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b, 5173, 5193 (2000); Emerging from Isabel, supra note 86.
When assistance is “essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting
from a major disaster” the federal government can provide seventy-five percent of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 5170b. Under the Stafford Act, supplemental federal disaster relief is only
provided after local and state governments have applied resources. Id.
88. Governor Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana has been locked in a bitter battle with the
federal government over reimbursement amounts for the state’s Road Home program, which
provided compensation to homeowners who experienced only wind damage from Hurricane
Katrina. David Hammer, Blanco Move May Signal Cease-fire; Shortfall Had Set Off Fedstate Bickering, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 3, 2007, at National 23. The state
asserts that it should receive compensation for its disbursements made under the Road Home
program because the state was never notified by the federal government that only flood
damage, and not wind damage, would be covered by the federal government. Id. The
federal government argues that this point was made explicit to the state. Id. When the costs
are of such magnitude the stakes are high because “whoever gets the blame will determine
whether Congress picks up the tab or forces Louisiana to tap its current operating budget
surplus to keep the Road Home solvent.” Id.
The tension between states and the federal government is further reflected in
comments made by Republican Senator Tom Coburn, who announced that he did not
“believe that everything that should happen in Louisiana should be paid for by the rest of the
country. I believe there are certain responsibilities that are due the people of Louisiana.”
Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Split Over Big Plans for Storm Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005,
at A1 (quotation marks omitted).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.
90. Leslie Eaton, Gulf Hits Snags in Rebuilding Public Works, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2007, at A1.
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ments’ eligibility for federal funds is contingent on their ability to follow
certain requirements such as advancing ten percent of the costs for building
projects.91 Local governments argue that the ten percent requirement makes
disaster relief funds unattainable.92 While ten percent seems like a modest
contribution for municipalities, it can still amount to millions of dollars
depending on the magnitude of the natural disaster and the cost of repairs.
The tension between states and the federal government concerning who
should bear the responsibility for the costs of disaster relief and repairs is
likely to intensify in the future. The effects associated with climate change
and ensuing sea-level rise will be widespread.93 A Hurricane Katrina once
every thirty years can be dismissed as an isolated event or an act of God,
but if a hurricane of similar magnitude struck the United States every year,
or every two years, our thinking about coastal communities and responses
would likely change.94 What if a hurricane of such magnitude struck the
same location every year? What if the rising sea level started to frequently
flood Manhattan? It is now projected that by 2020 a single storm could
cause $500 billion in damage.95 The science surrounding climate change

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See CARTER, supra note 42, at 557-58.
The projected rises in sea-level . . . will lead to coast erosion and redistribution of
sediments, wetland submergence, flood plain water logging and salt intrusion into
coastal aquifers. These changes will, in turn, cause disruption of residential,
industrial and commercial activities, sever transport routes and ruin agricultural land.
The consequences are staggering, both in human and financial terms . . . .
Id.
94. Hurricane Katrina, with total costs as high as $250 billion, was the most costly
disaster in American history. FEMA and Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Disaster Recovery and S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Ray Nagin, New Orleans Mayor). Katrina killed
1,400 Louisiana residents, displaced 1.3 million people, destroyed 18,000 businesses, and
damaged 134,344 housing units and ninety-five percent of the city’s 350 buildings. Id.; see
also Klein & Zellmer, supra note 57, at 1499-1502 (describing damages inflicted by
Hurricane Katrina). The city’s infrastructure including utilities, roads, drainage, pumps,
bridges, water supply facilities, and communications, were damaged or destroyed by the 480
billion pounds of water that entered the city. FEMA and Gulf Coast Rebuilding, supra.
Such amazing losses have led some experts like Daniel P. Schrag, director of the Harvard
University Center for the Environment, to question whether it is rational to spend hundreds
of millions of dollars to repair a city that will be “in harm’s way once again.” See Some
Experts Say It’s Time to Evacuate the Coast, supra note 23, at F4 (quotation marks omitted).
The stakes of rebuilding in the Gulf Coast are high, considering that FEMA has allocated
more than $8.3 billion to state and local governments in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. Schleifstein, supra note 28.
95. Kenneth Chang, In Study, A History Lesson On the Costs of Hurricanes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2005, at A1.

2008]

Redefining the American Coastline

117

suggests that these possibilities stand to become reality. Although we can
try to harness technology to better protect the coasts, history and scientific
projections suggest that this is a losing battle.
C. Conclusion
In the future, exorbitant costs associated with rebuilding coastal
communities combined with the worsening effects of climate change have
the potential to push society past a threshold for which it is willing to bear
those costs.96 At this tipping point, a new coastal community ethic is likely
to emerge whereby coastal living would be characterized as a private risk
rather than a social risk.97 Under these circumstances, governments could
begin to retreat from the coast by withdrawing basic services from coastal
communities and refusing to repair damaged infrastructure. Although this
result is not certain, the legal implications of such actions are important to
consider.
IV. CAN THE GOVERNMENT CHANGE ITS PUBLIC POLICY FOR FREE?
A. Overview
In the future, local and state governments could begin to geographically
redefine inhabitable boundaries in an effort to reduce the cost of coastal
communities. Rather than attempting to acquire coastal property through
eminent domain, which would be cost prohibitive,98 local and state
governments could retreat from the coast. A retreat from the coast could
be orchestrated in two ways. First, the federal government could phase out
96. See PHILIPPI, supra note 3, at 4-5. Living in certain coastal communities is akin to
living on an active volcano: “very scenic and very risky.” BUSH ET AL., supra note 14, at 12.
When the volcano erupts, states and local governments will be forced to expend greater tax
dollars to cover damages, and this will likely lead to a new thought process surrounding
coastal communities:
Only when we have learned the economic lessons of the past will we give up spending
money on those programs that make it safe and profitable to locate at the rivers’ edge,
since the end result is only to create greater economic damages. We will instead
allow our floodplains to revert back to their natural ecologically healthy states,
because it makes good economic sense to do it.
PHILIPPI, supra note 3, at 4-5.
97. See generally HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC
POLICY LESSONS 3 (1978). Private risks are those risks that “refer to actions taken by an
individual which affect himself but not society.” Id. Social risks occur “when the general
public bears the costs of negative outcomes associated with a particular action.” Id.
98. See Barnhizer, supra note 63, at 297.
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or decline to provide exceptional services such as subsidized flood
insurance. Without the safety net of subsidized flood insurance, property
owners would directly bear the risks of living in precarious coastal
locations. Because the cost of private insurance would approximate the
risks of coastal living, property owners would be forced to internalize the
cost of their choices, which could result in many people making alternative
decisions.
Second, local or state governments could attempt to retreat from the
coast by withdrawing basic services from coastal communities like utilities,
roads, and highways. Although private landowners would be allowed to
remain in their homes and in their communities, the costs associated with
living in these areas would shift from the government to landowners.
The National Flood Insurance Program has existed for over forty years
and currently there is nothing to suggest that the political will exists within
the federal government to eliminate subsidized flood insurance. The
federal government internalizes costs at a much slower rate than local and
state governments because its supply of capital from taxes and debt is far
greater. For instance, President Bush recently sent Congress a $3.1 trillion
budget.99 Clearly, there are many critics of this level of federal spending,
but the average citizen does not internalize these federal costs.
A greater likelihood exists that the American coastline will be
redefined by local and state governments.100 The average citizen is acutely
aware of the costs of local and state initiatives.101 People internalize the
costs of government programs through their property taxes. In return, local
and state governments reflect their constituencies’ sensitivity to taxes and
expenditures. The magnitude of coastal destruction in the future and its
corresponding costs make it far more likely that local and state governments will be the first to react to these changes.
Local and state governments’ attempts to reduce flood and storm
related costs and to discourage coastal growth would not be stymied by the
continued supply of federal flood insurance subsidies. Property owners
would still be permitted to own and maintain their property, but they could

99. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Bush Presents Budget That Would Increase
Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2008, at A20.
100. See Hammer, supra note 88; see also Noel K. Gallagher, Voters Fickle on Funding
Local Projects; Economic Pressure and Doubts about the Public’s Benefit Prompt Many
Towns to Reject Referendums, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 18, 2007, at B1 (stating that
many spending measures for infrastructure projects were rejected by voters because of tax
implications); William Yardley, Building Costs Deal Heavy Blow to Local Budgets, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2008, at A1 (describing ways in which local governments are struggling to
maintain basic infrastructure in cities and towns).
101. See generally Gallagher, supra note 100.
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no longer depend on local and state governments to provide road repairs,
sewer service, or electricity to their property. Regardless of whether
federal flood insurance has staying power, local and state infrastructure
along the coast may not.
Many interesting legal questions are raised by the collision of property
owners’ rights with the government’s interest in retreating from the coast.
One central question relates to the legal basis on which property owners
could attempt to recover damages or compensation resulting from the
government’s changed public policy. Property owners could undoubtedly
attempt to recover on various theories of liability, such as promissory
estoppel and nuisance. While these claims might have merit and should be
explored elsewhere, this Comment specifically analyzes property owners’
takings claims in situations where the government withdraws basic services
from a coastal community and refuses to rebuild damaged infrastructure.102
The outcome of this issue has far reaching implications for property
owners, local and state governments, and our coasts. Takings claims, in
this context, raise the issue of whether the government can change its
public policy for free. If the government can withdraw basic services from
endangered coastal communities without having to compensate landowners,
then such actions could radically transform the concentration of people who
live along the coast.103 The withdrawal of basic services would provide a
substantial disincentive for continued coastal development and would likely
lead to the dispersal of many coastal communities. Additionally, a mass
exodus from the coast could enable certain coastal areas to return to their
“natural state.” Governments could potentially purchase land that was
previously cost prohibitive and transform vast expanses of coastal land into
protected conservation areas. If, however, the government would be
required to pay compensation to landowners for takings, then the status quo
would likely persist as local and state governments could not afford the
overwhelming costs related to compensating each landowner.
To analyze landowners’ potential takings claims, this Part first addresses
a series of cases in which municipalities refused to extend utilities to

102. Takings claims arise under the Fifth Amendment, which states that no person shall
“be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
According to the United States Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Bill of Rights so that it applies to states. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 65-66 (1995).
103. The withdrawal of basic resources from the coast could be useful in avoiding the
problem of “double takes” which have allowed “floodplain developers to ‘take’ resources
from taxpayers” through regulatory takings and flood resources like insurance subsidies.
Klein & Zellmer, supra note 57, at 1474.
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residents.104 Although service extension cases are factually distinguishable
from situations where governments withdraw services, many of the factors
used by courts to decide extension cases are analogous. Next, relying on
cases where landowners’ property has been flooded, this Part explores the
merits of landowners’ physical takings claims. Then, this Part discusses
landowners’ takings claims based on a theory of substantial interference.
Finally, this Part examines the ways in which courts may interpret
landowners’ cases under a regulatory takings framework. This analysis is
divided into two subdivisions. First, it evaluates whether Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council could support landowners’ takings claims,105
then it considers the ways in which the factors used by the Court in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York would affect the takings
analysis.106 Specifically, this Part examines the ways in which a
government’s actions would influence: (1) the economic value of the
landowners’ property; (2) the reasonable investment-backed expectations
of landowners; and (3) the nature of the government action.107
Although certain facts may allow landowners to make persuasive
takings claims, this takings analysis suggests that courts are likely to grant
governments deference to make important policy determinations regarding
coastal development and services.
B. Utility Extension Cases: Courts’ Deference to Governments’ Public
Policy Decisions
1. Overview
Utilities are provided to the public in one of two ways. First, some
utilities are provided by municipal corporations that are publicly owned.108
In these municipalities, the city or town has direct authority and oversight
over the utility.109 In other areas of the country, state legislatures have

104. Currently, there are no cases on point that address an outcome to this issue.
105. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
106. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
107. Id. at 124.
108. MARTIN T. FARRIS & ROY J. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION,
MANAGEMENT, AND OWNERSHIP 267, 270-71 (1973) (“[T]he extent of public ownership of
utilities at both state (including local) and federal levels is generally limited only by public
opinion as expressed through legislative bodies, and not by constitutions and courts.”). A
majority of cities with populations that exceed 5000 people operate municipal water services.
Id. at 269.
109. See id. at 267.
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passed statutes that allow private corporations to provide utilities.110 The
process for altering service requirements varies depending on whether
services are provided through a government regulated public utility or a
municipal operated utility.111 Despite these differences, courts’ analysis of
municipal utilities’ duty to furnish services is similar to situations where
state legislatures alter service requirements for public utilities.112
Utility extension cases provide a useful analogy to understand the
factors courts may consider when assessing landowners’ takings claims
against the government for the withdrawal of basic services.113 These cases

110. Id. at 21, 61-65. Public utilities, which are utilities provided by private businesses
generally have two defining characteristics:
First, they must serve all buyers within their market area without undue discrimination
up to the limits of their capacity . . . . Second, public utilities must sell their services at
‘reasonable’ rates or prices; in application, reasonable prices are prices that will give the
utility firm no more than ‘reasonable’ earnings under prudent management.
Id. at 21.
111. Municipalities retain broad discretion to make determinations concerning the
extension of their utilities. See e.g., Wickenburg v. Sabin, 200 P.2d 342 (Ariz. 1948). State
legislatures define the parameters regarding service requirements in states where private
corporations furnish utilities to residents. See 35-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (2002) (stating that
Maine public utilities are required to “furnish safe, reasonable and adequate facilities and
service”); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-2-1(a) (2007) (requiring “[e]very public utility . . .
to furnish safe, reasonable, and adequate services and facilities”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §
2801 (2007); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406 (2007). States such as New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have specific statutory requirements that must exist in order
for a public utility to terminate services. N.H. Rev. Stat. § 363-B:1 (2007) (preventing
termination of public gas and electric utilities for “any residential service without good
cause” and ten days written notice); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 39-1.1-1, 39-1.1-2.1 (2007)
(preventing public utilities from discontinuing service to households where either all adults
are over age of sixty-five or where a person under the age of twelve months is domiciled);
66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1406, 1503, 1524 (2007) (describing specific factors that
authorize a utility to refuse service such as nonpayment, failure to comply with payment
agreements, and failure to allow access to meters and service connections).
112. The distinction between municipal operated utilities and public utilities is meaningful
in the context of this Comment in so far as it would affect the way in which local or state
governments could alter utility services. Municipalities have broad discretion to alter utility
services whereas public utilities must follow state laws and administrative regulations. State
legislatures, however, have the discretion to amend service requirements and termination
provisions. For the purposes of this Comment, I proceed under the assumption that the
deference provided to municipalities in providing services is similar to that held by state
governments in crafting legislation that affects service requirements.
113. Utility cases are factually distinct from potential takings claims in the coastal context.
In utility cases, the government refuses to extend services, but in the coastal context
discussed in this Comment, the government would be withdrawing services. Additionally,
in utility extension cases the landowners never previously received services whereas in the
coastal context the government withdrew pre-existing services.
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also illustrate the deference that courts provide to municipal operated
utilities to make policy determinations regarding the way in which
resources are used. Utility cases suggest that landowners’ takings claims
against the government for the withdrawal of basic services would be
unsuccessful.
2. Municipal Service Extension Cases
The extension of water within municipal boundaries is left to the
discretion of the government.114 This discretion is only restricted in
circumstances where the government refuses to provide services that only
require ministerial acts.115 Typically, courts allow municipalities to
exercise reasonable discretion to determine whether services are extended
so long as municipalities consider either the physical remoteness of the area
proposed for expansion or the expense associated with an extension.116
Municipalities’ authority to make policy determinations is best
illustrated by Lawrence v. Richards, in which a state court held that a water
district was not required to extend water mains to each and every individual

114. Wickenburg, 200 P.2d at 342; Browne v. Bentonville, 126 S.W. 93 (Ark. 1910); Marr
v. Glendale, 181 P. 671 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Linck v. Litchfield, 31 Ill. App. 118 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1888); Moore v. Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. 926 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907); Lawrence v.
Richards, 88 A. 92 (Me. 1913); Schriver v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 181 A.
443 (Md. 1935); City of Greenwood v. Provine, 108 So. 284 (Miss. 1926); Braiser v.
Lincoln, 65 N.W.2d 213 (Neb. 1954); Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 107
A.2d 20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954); Rose v. Plymouth Town, 173 P.2d 285 (Utah
1946).
115. Wickenburg, 200 P.2d at 345 (upholding writ of mandamus compelling city to
provide services to landowner where burden to city “merely involved the making of an
ordinary service connection with existing lines”); see also Provine, 108 So. at 286 (stating
that if case presented issue where water mains preexisted and only needed to be connected,
then “we are inclined to view that the remedy would lie [a writ of mandamus], because the
writ would then be for the purpose of compelling the city to perform a duty, a ministerial act
or administrative duty, about which it would have no discretion”).
116. Provine, 108 So. at 285 (holding that city acted within its discretion in refusing to
extend water main that was 700 feet from landowner’s property because of substantial costs
to municipality); see also Glendale, 181 P. at 672 (holding that city exercised reasonable
discretion in refusing to extend services to landowner whose property was elevated 200 feet
beyond the distribution range of city’s system); Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. at 926 (denying
grant of injunction to property owner seeking extension of water mains to remote area within
city on grounds that government, rather than courts, are charged with managing city affairs);
Schriver, 181 A. at 446 (holding that city could not be compelled to extend water mains to
property owner where city lacked capacity and finances to complete project); Rose, 173 P.2d
at 287 (holding that town exercised appropriate discretion in refusing to extend water mains
where costs were substantial).
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within the water district.117 The court described parts of the district as
containing “scatteringly settled” areas with varying elevations to highlight
the absurdity of requiring the water district to provide services to all
residents:
If this contention [made by the plaintiff] has real merit, the
consequence is that the trustees, acting for the district, are legally
bound to supply water to all inhabitants, no matter how large the
cost of the undertaking, now [sic] how small the revenue, and no
matter how ruinous and destructive the result might be to the
financial ability of the district to carry on its operations. That this
contention is not sound is, we think, easily demonstrable.118
To prevent a “ruinous and destructive” outcome, the court concluded
that the trustees of the water district could “use their judgment and exercise
their discretion” in determining when and where services should be
extended.119
Even in Braiser v. Lincoln, where the plaintiff developed his property
in reliance on a city ordinance authorizing the extension of water to his
property, the state court held that the city had the discretionary authority to
repeal the ordinance without destroying the landowner’s constitutional
property rights.120 Moreover, the court explicitly rejected the argument that
a city ordinance providing for the extension of water mains to the plaintiff’s
property created an enforceable contract between the plaintiff and the
city.121
State courts’ deferential approach to municipal utility extensions is
based on several underlying premises. First, courts believe that extension
decisions are best made by legislative or administrative bodies because
these democratically elected bodies are connected to the people and able to
117. Richards, 88 A. at 95. The plaintiff, who was seeking a writ of mandamus, argued
that he had a vested legal right to water services and that the trustees of the water district
were without the authority to exercise their discretion. Id. at 94.
118. Id. at 95.
119. Id.; see also Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. at 926 (refusing to grant plaintiff’s writ of
mandamus against city officials to compel city to extend water mains and electric lines to his
property because of discretionary powers vested in city officials to make such
determinations).
120. Braiser, 65 N.W.2d at 215, 218; see also Hollister Park Inv. Co. v. Goleta County
Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d. 290, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting land developer’s
takings claim where city refused to extend new water service connection to property because
of water shortage); Reid Dev. Corp., 107 A.2d at 23 (holding that municipality does not have
“to take a stake in the speculation” of development of property by extending services to
landowner).
121. Braiser, 65 N.W.2d at 218.
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respond to the public’s needs.122 Second, courts are concerned that the
well-being of all residents is threatened by forcing the extension of services
to satisfy the needs of a disproportionate few.123 State courts indicate that
municipalities must be given flexibility to determine the way in which tax
revenues are spent.124 A municipality may determine that the forty
thousand dollars it would cost to extend a water line is better spent
improving roads or repairing schools.125 Third, courts are reluctant to
engage in the act of balancing competing needs because of a belief that
governments have greater information and resources to make complex
policy decisions.126 Consequently, decisions in these cases reflect judicial
restraint so as not to usurp the governing powers of municipalities.127
Most importantly, some utility cases also stand for the proposition that
the government may alter its public policy for free even if a landowner has
relied on a government service.128 The courts’ holdings in these cases
further suggest that citizens have notice that governments frequently alter
the course of their public policy and change their laws. Thus, landowners
who attempt to recover on a theory of reliance will not prevail.129
3. Conclusion
Utilities cases reveal that coastal landowners’ takings claims based on
the government’s withdrawal of services would be dismissed by many state
courts. Barring certain facts suggesting bad faith or unreasonableness,
courts typically grant governments deference to make policy decisions
regarding the extension or withdrawal of basic services from coastal
communities. Even claimants who were able to provide facts illustrating

122. Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. at 926 (“The city authorities are on the ground. They live
among the people who pay the taxes. They can judge much better than we can as to what
the best interest of the city requires.”).
123. See Richards, 88 A. at 95.
124. See Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. at 926.
125. See id.
126. See City of Greenwood v. Provine, 108 So. 284, 286 (Miss. 1926) (stating that
possible extension requires consideration of demand for extension and revenues to be
obtained).
127. Richards, 88 A. at 94.
128. See Brasier v. City of Lincoln, 65 N.W.2d 213, 215, 218 (Neb. 1954); Hollister Park
Inc. Co. v. Goleta County Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 290 at 294 (Cal. Ct. App.1978); Reid
Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 107 A.2d 20, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1954).
129. See Braiser, 65 N.W.2d at 215, 218; see also Hollister Park Inv. Co., 82 Cal. App.
3d. at 294 (stating that potential water users do not possess the same rights as existing water
users).
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a reliance on continued services would be unable to recover compensation
according to some courts’ decisions. Utilities cases support the argument
that either extending or withdrawing services is a policy decision that
governments, rather than the courts, have the authority to make.
C. Physical Takings Claims
Coastal landowners could attempt to characterize the government’s
withdrawal of basic services from the coast as a physical taking. Two key
issues would likely influence the success of landowners’ physical takings
claims. First, landowners would have the burden of proving that the government’s withdrawal of services from the coast caused a physical invasion of
their land. Second, assuming that landowners could overcome the burden of
proving causation, landowners would also need to demonstrate that the
government had appropriated their land. A body of case law dealing with
physical takings claims and floods indicates that coastal claimants’ physical
takings claims would likely be resolved in favor of the government.
Any permanent, physical intrusion by the government onto a landowner’s property constitutes a per se taking.130 In Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., the United States Supreme Court focused on two
key factors for assessing takings claims: (1) the physical nature of the
invasion; and (2) the duration of the invasion.131 The Court’s concern with
the invasion of the plaintiff’s property, regardless of the extent, related to
a belief that to allow a physical invasion of property would be to “empty
the [property] right of any value.”132

130. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding
state law caused taking by requiring landlords to allow cable companies to place half-inch
diameter cables along their buildings); see also Lovett v. W. Va. Cent. Gas Co., 65 S.E. 196,
200 (W. Va. 1909) (holding that taking occurred where a gas company laid pipes on
plaintiff’s property without plaintiff’s consent); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Webb, 393 S.W.2d 117,
121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (“We think that to the extent the land is invaded and the owner’s
proprietary rights in it are taken, the land is taken.”).
131. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; see also Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that “‘permanent’ does not mean forever” it can mean “in the
language of real property law, an estate for years, that is, a term of finite duration as distinct
from the infinite term of an estate in fee simple absolute”) (citation omitted).
132. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436. The Court’s protection against physical invasions of
property appeared to be based on Blackstone’s proposition that private property is
characterized by one’s right to exclude and to control:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the
affections of mankind, as the right of property ; [sic] or that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world,
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.
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Coastal landowners, who relied on a Loretto paradigm to articulate
physical takings claims, would likely argue that the government’s
withdrawal of services allowed for the physical invasion of their property.
These arguments would be based on a factual scenario in which claimants’
property was flooded and thereby altered as a result of the government’s
failure to maintain certain flood control devices.
In some instances, landowners could attempt to argue that their cases
were similar to other flooding cases because the government’s design and
creation of drainage systems, pumps, and other watercourses may have
altered the landscape to such a degree that their property became especially
susceptible to flooding in situations where the government refused to
operate its flood control systems.133 This argument is based on the idea that
humans have altered the landscape to such a degree that the cause of coastal
flooding could not be characterized as “natural.” Coastal claimants’
arguments would be limited to the extent that they can persuasively
demonstrate that the government’s withdrawal of basic services had a
causal relationship to their property invasion.134
The Supreme Court, along with other state courts, have explicitly
distinguished between cases where the government caused intentional
flooding and cases where nature is the underlying cause of landowners’
permanent physical invasion.135 In cases where the Supreme Court found

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2; see also Loretto,
438 U.S. at 435 (stating that through permanent, physical occupations of another’s property
the “government does not simply take a single strand from the bundle of property rights: it
chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand”) (quotation marks omitted).
133. See Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 935 P.2d 796, 797 (Cal. 1997) (“[W]hen
a public entity’s design, construction, or maintenance of a flood control project poses an
unreasonable risk of harm to property historically subject to flooding and causes substantial
damage to it, the property owners may recover damages for inverse condemnation . . . .”);
see also Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Utah 1990) (“As a result of
these improvements, the natural drainage pattern was altered so that all surface water
draining from the subdivision flows toward the Hamblins’ property.”). A physical takings
claim by coastal landowners based on a theory of government alteration of the landscape,
while potentially persuasive, would be highly fact specific. It is quite possible that many
courts would find these claims to be too attenuated to constitute physical takings.
134. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924).
135. Compare United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468-69 (1903) (holding that taking
occurred where construction of dam impeded natural flow of stream causing permanent
flooding over plaintiff’s property); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1871)
(holding that government’s creation of dam caused continuous flooding of plaintiff’s
property); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917) (holding that dam caused
river waters to rise and permanently invade plaintiff’s property); United States v. Dickinson,
331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) (holding that plaintiff be compensated for taking caused by
flooding from government’s use of dam to raise river); Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 843
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physical takings from flood related incidents, the physical invasion of
claimants’ property was directly attributable to the government’s actions.136
Thus, when major floods strike, landowners have the burden of proving that
their damages were caused by the government.137 The failure of a
government structure to withstand floods, by itself, is insufficient to
support a landowner’s takings claim.138 Flooding has been treated by some
courts as a superseding cause of all damage, which makes it nearly
impossible for landowners to articulate successful physical takings
claims.139 Many coastal landowners would fail to meet the causal requirements for a physical takings claim. Here, the government’s contention that
landowners would have suffered damages regardless of its decision to
withdraw services is supported by the Court’s jurisprudence.

P.2d 400, 402 (Or. 1992) (holding that taking occurred where city’s discharge of effluent
from a sewage treatment plant destroyed plaintiff’s crops and killed plaintiff’s livestock);
and Hamblin, 795 P.2d at 1133-34 (holding that plaintiffs may be entitled to compensation
for flooding of land caused by city constructed drainage system at nearby subdivision); with
Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 147-48 (denying compensation to plaintiff on grounds that
government had not caused the physical invasion of landowner’s property); and Singleton
v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 156, 162-63 (Cl. Ct. 1984) (denying compensation to plaintiff
whose land was flooded because flooding resulted from a 100-year flood rather than
government created dam). These cases illustrate the applicability of the tort concept of
proximate causation to takings claims. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 47 (1985).
136. Lynah, 188 U.S. at 468-69; see, e.g., Cress, 243 U.S. at 327-28; see also Pumpelly,
80 U.S. at 177-78.
137. Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149 (“[I]n order to create an enforceable liability against the
Government, it is, at least, necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure . . . .”); see also Singleton, 6 Cl. Ct. at 163-64 (concluding that extreme flooding provided irrefutable evidence that taking did not occur); Bunch, 935 P.2d at 799, 810
(concluding that flood control district was not liable for flood damage where a 300-year
flood broke levee and flooded plaintiff’s property).
138. See Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 147 (finding no taking where canal constructed by the
government overflowed and flooded plaintiff’s property because “[t]he land would have
been flooded if the canal had not been constructed”); see also Bodin v. Standwood, 901 P.2d
1065, 1066, 1070 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no taking where extreme flooding caused
city’s sewage lagoon to spill over onto plaintiff’s property). Using the rationale of Bunch,
a district that provides flood control services has no affirmative duty to ensure that such
services prevent all flooding. Bunch, 935 P.2d at 799, 810. When the government is
actively providing flood control services, the government’s duty is limited to the proper
operation of the flood control system. See id. at 799, 809. Thus, a government has the
ability to choose whether or not to create and operate a flood control system; however, if it
operates such a system then it has a duty to ensure that the system functions properly,
receives proper maintenance, and is repaired in a timely manner after it is damaged. See id.
at 799, 808-09.
139. See Singleton, 6 Cl. Ct. at 163-64; see also Bunch, 935 P.2d at 802.
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Even assuming that landowners could overcome the causal component
required in physical takings claims involving flooding, the Court has also
required that the nature of the flooding “constitute an actual, permanent
invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an
injury to the property.”140 Many coastal landowners could not meet the
permanent physical invasion standard.141 The flooding experienced by
coastal landowners would most likely be intermittent, which is insufficient
to constitute a physical taking because the landowners would retain use and
control of their property.142 In these situations, plaintiffs’ legal recourse
would appear to arise under a tort theory of negligence rather than a
constitutional takings claim.
Additionally, landowners would likely be unable to demonstrate that
their entire bundle of property rights had been appropriated by the government. The concept of appropriation has been a central component of
courts’ physical takings analysis.143 Courts make determinations concerning appropriation of property based on evidence that reveals the intent of
the government’s actions.144 Prima facie evidence against physical
appropriations may be established when the government does not manifest
intent to usurp a claimant’s property rights.145 It would be difficult for
claimants to characterize subsequent flood damage as an appropriation of
their land in situations where the government has withdrawn basic services
from the coast. Landowners would retain control over their fundamental
140. Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149 (stating that permanent physical invasion of land must
amount to “an appropriation of and not merely an injury to the property”); see also Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (stating that “an
appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests
. . . [because] the government does not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of
property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand”).
141. In some instances a landowner may be able to show that a piece of government
property such as a vehicle, utility poll, or building structure was relocated to their property
and constituted a permanent physical invasion of their land. In these limited circumstances,
landowners may have successful takings claims if the government refused to remove the
debris.
142. Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149.
143. See id.; see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
144. Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258, 259 (1946) (holding that
frequent flights by military aircraft, which caused loud noises and bright lights at night,
amounted to a taking because of clear intent by government to occupy airspace above
plaintiff’s land); with Nat’l Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’n v. United States, 395 U.S.
85, 92-93 (1969) (concluding that no taking occurred where military briefly occupied
plaintiff’s property because military’s mission was related to protection and preservation of
plaintiff’s property thereby creating a situation “in which governmental occupation does not
deprive the private owner of any use of his property”).
145. See Nat’l Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 395 U.S. at 92-93.

2008]

Redefining the American Coastline

129

bundle of property rights, including the right to control, use, and exclude
others from their property. Indeed, to say that the withdrawal of the
government’s services from a coastal area amounts to an appropriation of
a claimant’s property is almost paradoxical because it is unclear what the
government would have taken.146
1. Physical Takings Conclusion
Coastal landowners would likely be unable to prevail using a physical
takings theory. It would be challenging for plaintiffs to argue that their
property suffered a permanent physical invasion. Even if one could demonstrate that property was permanently flooded, it would be challenging to
prove that the government, rather than nature, was the cause. It would also
be difficult to convince a court that the government’s purpose in withdrawing basic services from the coast was to intentionally interfere with
property rights. Finally, the government’s withdrawal of services would
not be tantamount to an appropriation of claimants’ property. Courts’
analysis of physical takings claims reveals a longstanding tension between
protecting landowners’ sacred bundle of property rights and providing
governments with the flexibility to operate.
D. Substantial Interference with Landowners’
Relationship to Their Property
1. Overview
Non-regulatory takings claims arise in contexts other than permanent
physical invasions of property. A number of state courts have upheld
takings claims when the government substantially interferes with plaintiffs’
relationship to their property. In these cases, the government’s actions
often stop short of physically invading a person’s property; nevertheless,
courts have found that the government has taken a stick from the owner’s
bundle of property rights. In relying on these cases, coastal claimants could
argue, in limited circumstances, that the government’s withdrawal of basic
services from the coast substantially interfered with their property rights.
Ultimately, this argument would likely be rejected by most federal and state
courts.

146. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (discussing what is included in the bundle of property
rights).
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2. Substantial Impairment: State Court Case Law
Many state courts have found takings where governments’ actions
eliminate or interfere with landowners’ access to their property.147 Several
states have relied upon a “substantial impairment” test to determine
whether the government’s actions constitute a taking.148 The substantial
impairment test dispenses with the requirement that the government’s
actions physically alter landowners’ property, a requirement that has traditionally been emphasized by federal courts’ physical takings analysis.149
For example, in Palm Beach County v. Tessler, the government planned to
construct a wall that would block all access to, and visibility of, the
plaintiff’s beauty salon.150 The state court concluded that even though there
was “no physical appropriation of the property itself,” the plaintiff was still
entitled to compensation for a taking because of the “substantial loss of
access.”151 Similarly, other state courts have focused their attention on the
reasonableness and suitableness of landowners’ access to their property.152

147. See Arizona v. Wilson, 438 P.2d 760, 764 (Ariz. 1968) (holding that taking occurred
where State’s destruction of landowner’s direct access to property was complete); Palm
Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 1989) (holding that substantial loss of
access to property constitutes taking despite no physical invasion of property); Harrington
v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 567 So. 2d 731, 733 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that utility pole
affecting ingress and egress to landowner’s property caused taking because impairment was
substantial); Nevada v. Linnecke, 468 P.2d 8, 11 (Nev. 1970) (affirming jury award for
landowners because direct access to their property was “substantially impaired” by state’s
creation of new interstate road); Boehm v. Backes, 493 N.W.2d 671, 675 (N.D. 1992)
(holding that closure of street intersection by State was a taking because such action
unreasonably impaired landowner’s direct access to property); Orcutt v. Town of Richmond,
517 A.2d 1160, 1161 (N.H. 1986) (holding that town’s discontinuance of road limiting
landowner’s frontage on public road was a taking where no other reasonable means of access
to property existed); Priestly v. New York, 242 N.E.2d 827, 830 (N.Y. 1968) (awarding
damages to landowner after property taken by state made access to property unsuitable); In
re County of Rockland, 147 A.D.2d 478, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that
consequential damages may be awarded if government’s action of limiting access to property
causes diminution in actual or potential development use); Vallone v. City of Cranston
Dep’t. of Pub. Works, 197 A.2d 310, 317-18 (R.I. 1964) (awarding landowners severance
damages for city’s acquisition of sewer easement thereby restricting landowner’s use and
access of street to access property).
148. Linnecke, 468 P.2d at 11 (“We adopt the rule that there is right of action when the
highway suffers a substantial change in relation to the property.”); Tessler, 538 So. 2d at
849; Harrington, 567 So. 2d at 733; Boehm, 493 N.W.2d at 675.
149. Compare Tessler, 538 So. 2d at 849; and Boehm, 493 N.W.2d at 675; with Loretto,
458 U.S. 419, 441; and W. Va. Cent. Gas Co., 65 S.E. 196, 200 (W. Va. 1909).
150. Tessler, 538 So. 2d at 847.
151. Id. at 849.
152. Priestly, 242 N.E.2d at 830; Orcutt, 517 A.2d at 1161.
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Courts, however, have differentiated between government actions that
cause a substantial impairment to property and those actions that merely
create a circuitous means of access for landowners.153
Relying on a substantial interference theory, coastal claimants could
argue that their property rights were inextricably related to their ability to
access their land.154 Moreover, the government’s refusal to rebuild
infrastructure impaired their ability to both access and use their land, which
was equivalent to emptying their property rights of value.155
This line of argument may initially sound compelling, but a situation
where the government actively alters landowners’ ability to access their
property is distinguishable from instances where the government declines
to maintain preexisting access points for reasons similar to those discussed
in the physical takings realm. In the latter situation, the government has
neither sought to infringe upon landowners’ property rights nor appropriate
their land for alternative uses.156 Similar to municipal utility cases, courts
would likely afford governments similar deference to make policy determinations surrounding which roads, bridges, and highways to maintain.157
Just as governments have the authority to select the roads that get paved or
repaired and the potholes that get filled, governments also retain the power
to decline to maintain certain roads.158
Many coastal claimants would initially be unable to make substantial
interference takings claims because they would retain means of ingress and
egress to their property following a disaster. These coastal claimants would
have to wait for a period of time to elapse until either a natural event
destroyed their means of ingress and egress or roads connected to their
property fell into such disrepair as to interfere with their access. In both

153. See Priestly, 242 N.E.2d at 830 (concluding that circuitous access to property, while
not determinative, diminishes likelihood of a taking); see also Orcutt, 517 A.2d at 1161; In
re County of Rockland, 147 A.D.2d at 480.
154. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946) (concluding that low flying
military planes came “so close to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the
surface of the land itself”). Coastal claimants could argue that the government’s actions
affected their relationship with their property. Just as low flying aircraft created noise and
light disturbances that prevented the plaintiff from enjoying his property, plaintiffs in coastal
communities could argue that the refusal to rebuild washed-out roads and bridges interfered
with their ability to access and use their property. See id.
155. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982).
156. Contra Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924); see also Loretto, 458
U.S. at 435 n.12.
157. See e.g., Lawrence v. Richards, 88 A. 92, 95 (Me. 1913).
158. See e.g., Moore v. Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. 926 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907) (“The city
authorities are on the ground. They live among the people who pay the taxes. They can
judge much better than we can as to what the best interest of the city requires.”).
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situations, costal claimants would face causation challenges that were
similar to those presented with physical takings claims.
Lastly, landowners who relied on a theory of substantial interference
as the basis of their takings claim would most likely be restricted to
bringing their claims in state courts. The United States Supreme Court’s
takings jurisprudence has not recognized the substantial interference theory
in the takings realm as it has been applied by state courts. The potential
impediment for coastal claimants in using a substantial interference theory
to articulate a state takings claim is that states have the ability to enact new
laws or constitutional amendments that redefine the basis of a takings
claim.159 Thus, coastal claimants run the risk that the substantial
interference theory could instantaneously evaporate if certain statutes or
amendments were enacted.
3. Substantial Impairment Conclusion
A body of state case law has recognized takings claims where an overt
government action has substantially interfered with claimants’ property
rights. The substantial interference theory would likely be unpersuasive to
a court in a situation where the government withdrew basic services from
the coast because the government’s actions would not amount to an appropriation of the landowner’s rights. Furthermore, courts have traditionally
granted deference to governments to make policy decisions concerning the
allocation of government resources.
E. Regulatory Takings
1. Overview
Because coastal claimants’ physical takings claims are tenuous, a
regulatory takings paradigm could also be used by coastal claimants.
Although coastal claimants would be unlikely to prove a regulatory taking
under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,160 those claimants could
develop more persuasive takings arguments under the multi-factor test

159. Several states have considered legislation that would limit the scope of eminent
domain to prevent its use for the purpose of economic development. See generally S.B. 363,
60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Mont. 2007); L.B. 924, 99th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Neb. 2006); S.B. 2214,
60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2007); S.B. 781, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reconvened Sess. (Va.
2007).
160. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.161
Despite a few sound legal points, which coastal claimants could make using
a regulatory framework, the government would likely prevail. Regulatory
takings developed in Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon when the Court held that a
state statute prohibiting a coal company from mining anthracite coal was
a taking.162 The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he general rule at least is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”163 Since Pa. Coal, the Court’s
takings jurisprudence has developed two types of regulatory takings which
are embodied in Lucas164 and Penn Central Transportation Co.165
2. Lucas and Its Refinements
In Lucas, the Court found that a state statute caused a taking because
the statute prevented the plaintiff from building any permanent structures
on his property.166 In its holding, the Court defined a new subset of
regulatory takings—those which deny a landowner of all economic use of
their property.167 This per se takings theory was premised on the belief that
property and value are so interrelated that if property loses all of its value
or beneficial use it is nearly the same as losing the property itself.168 The
Court’s overarching concern with government regulations that deprive an
owner of all economic use of their land is that the property is being used for
the public.169 The Lucas per se takings rule was further refined and limited
in subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court.170 Specifically, the Court

161. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
162. 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
163. Id. at 415. The statute had gone “too far” because it stripped the coal company of its
subterranean rights, which had been negotiated and explicitly stated in a contract. Id. at 412.
164. 505 U.S. at 1003.
165. 438 U.S. 104.
166. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
167. Id.; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981).
168. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
169. Id. at 1018 (“[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use . . . carry with them a heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm.”).
170. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) (holding that thirty-two month moratorium on development was not a taking because
claimants’ land retained some value); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
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has emphasized that no economic use, as illustrated in Lucas, means “that
the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95%
instead of 100%.”171 Thus, the destruction of one strand in the bundle of
property rights, rather than the entire bundle, is insufficient to cause a
taking.172
Coastal claimants would face two substantial impediments to
articulating a valid rationale for the application of Lucas. First, a state or
local government’s withdrawal of basic services from coastal areas and
refusal to rebuild damaged infrastructure does not represent a typical
regulation. Regulations are usually thought to directly restrict landowners’
use of their property. The government’s decision to withdraw services
from a coastal community places no additional restriction on the way in
which plaintiffs can use their property. Therefore, a situation in which the
government withdrew basic services or refused to repair damaged
infrastructure is distinguishable from Lucas where a specific regulation
limited the plaintiff’s use of his property.173 The Lucas categorical rule
cannot apply if no regulation exists.
Even assuming that plaintiffs could somehow convince a court that
their rights were impaired by the government’s inaction, it would be
difficult for plaintiffs to show that the government’s refusal to rebuild their
infrastructure resulted in the loss of “all economically productive” use of
their property.174 A court would likely find that coastal claimants’ land still
retained value that was beyond a “token interest.” 175 Although a diminution in value may have occurred as a result of a change in the government’s
public policy, plaintiffs would still be able to sell their property in the real
estate market. For example, land trusts or governmental agencies could
seek to purchase habitats or create environmental buffer zones. Addition-

(2001) (holding that denial of development permit was not a regulatory taking because
plaintiff’s property still had value).
171. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 330. The Court has indicated that Lucas
could apply in circumstances where a landowner retained value that was merely a “token
interest.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
172. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 327. The Court has also expressed an
unwillingness to apply the Lucas standard to claimants’ conceptual severance arguments.
Id. at 332. Although the plaintiffs in Tahoe argued under Lucas that their property had lost
all economic value and beneficial use during a thirty-two month moratorium on
development, the Court rejected their conceptual severance argument and concluded that
“[l]ogically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on
economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”
Id. at 332.
173. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09.
174. Id. at 1030 (emphasis added).
175. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
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ally, unlike Lucas, plaintiffs could still develop and use their property.
Even if the government conceded that its refusal to rebuild infrastructure
resulted in a substantial loss in property value this would still fall short of
the legal standard outlined in Lucas. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
overriding concern that private property was being “pressed into some form
of public service” would be allayed in this scenario because plaintiffs
would retain all their original rights to use their property.176
A scenario in which the government withdraws basic services from a
coastal community does not readily fit under the categorical rule outlined
in Lucas. Coastal claimants may not be able to demonstrate that the
government’s actions amount to a regulatory act. Regardless, most coastal
claimants could not meet the exceedingly strict standard outlined by Lucas.
3. Penn Central: A Multi-factor Approach to Regulatory Takings
Assuming that most coastal landowners would be unable to claim that
their property had lost all economic use under Lucas, these plaintiffs would
likely be able to develop stronger takings claims under Penn Central.
Under Penn Central, the Supreme Court eschewed any “set formula” for
determining whether a taking had occurred and instead relied on a multifactor test to guide its “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. . . .”177 To
determine whether the government’s statute had caused a taking, the Court
considered: (1) the economic impact of the statute or regulation;178 (2) the
reasonable investment-backed expectations of the landowners;179 and (3)

176. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
177. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); see also TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 326-27 (using Penn Central multi-factor test to hold
that moratorium on development was not a taking); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (applying
Penn Central multi-factor test to hold that State’s regulations had not caused a taking).
178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. In examining the economic impact of a
regulation, the Court acknowledged that diminution in property value caused by a regulation
is not a useful way to determine whether a taking has occurred. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 413 (1922). This point was emphasized in Pa. Coal Co. when the Court stated
that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Id.
179. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. Simply because a statute may have
adversely affected a landowner’s future profits does not mean a claimant’s reasonable
investment-backed expectations have been undermined. Id. at 136; see also Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). Although the claimant in Penn Central lost future profits
because the claimant could not make an addition to the preexisting property, the regulation
in no way affected the way in which the property had been used “for the past 65 years.”
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 136.
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the character of the government action.180 Based on the application of these
factors, the Court held that a New York City law preventing landowners
from building a fifty-story addition to their property did not constitute a
taking.181 The Court rejected the argument that air rights above the
plaintiff’s property could be conceptually severed.182 The Court then
reasoned that plaintiffs were able to use their land in the same manner as
prior to the enactment of the statute.183
As was the case with Lucas, a court could find that a regulatory takings
framework was inapplicable to a factual scenario in which the government
had withdrawn basic services because there was no regulation. Assuming,
however, that a court used Penn Central to analyze plaintiffs’ takings
claims, plaintiffs may be able to develop persuasive arguments.
a. Economic Impact
Under the economic impact prong of Penn Central, coastal claimants’
primary line of argument would focus on the diminution of their property
value. Coastal claimants could assert that the government’s policy of
withdrawing basic services from the coast and refusing to rebuild damaged
infrastructure caused a diminution in their property value to such an extent
as to justify compensation. To further illustrate the economic effects of the
government’s action on their property, coastal claimants could characterize
basic services as inextricably intertwined with their larger bundle of
property rights.184 Thus, they could argue that damage to these property
rights reduced the value of their property.
The underlying problem with these arguments is twofold. First, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to hold that a mere change in property
value related to a government action constitutes a taking for fear that
government would be restricted from ever altering its public policy.185
Second, one could argue that the only value that has been “taken” from the
plaintiffs’ property was the value that the government had given to the

180. Id. at 124 (stating that the character of the government’s action focuses on whether
the regulation results in a physical invasion of the landowner’s property as compared to an
interference that “arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good”).
181. Id. at 136.
182. Id. at 130.
183. Id. at 136.
184. Just as the Court held that air rights could not be conceptually severed in Penn
Central, plaintiffs could argue that basic services were intricately tied to their larger bundle
of property rights and could not be severed.
185. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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plaintiffs’ property.186 Utilities and infrastructure represent goods and
services that are provided by governments, which influence property values.
Although these services may increase the economic value of property this
value is separate and distinct from the inherent value of the property. Public
services fall outside the traditional bundle of rights and do not require
government compensation.187 Taken to its logical extreme, if services were
treated as part of the bundle of rights, a series of school closures could cause
a diminution in property values and require compensation.
Because plaintiffs would still retain value in their property, the economic
losses they incurred would represent only the adjusting of benefits for the
public welfare.188
b. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
Relying on Penn Central’s second factor of reasonable investmentbacked expectations, coastal claimants could generate some of their most
persuasive takings arguments. Coastal plaintiffs could present compelling
accounts arguing that they purchased and developed their property in the
coastal community under the reasonable belief that the government would
continue to provide basic services. Moreover, plaintiffs could claim that such
services were furnished at the time they purchased the property, and that they
moved to the area because it was zoned as an area within the jurisdiction of
governmental services. Plaintiffs could also recount the numerous times in
which the government had rebuilt storm damaged infrastructure. Finally,
plaintiffs could claim that local and state governments encouraged them to
purchase and develop coastal property so as to increase and expand the community’s tax base. Based on these facts, plaintiffs would assert that the

186. See DONALD HAGMAN & DEAN MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND
VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 15 (1978) (stating that windfalls or betterments
enhance property value, but are not related to landowner’s actions). A windfall or
betterment can be defined as “any increase in the value of land (including the buildings
thereon) arising from central or local government action, whether positive, e.g., by the
execution of public works or improvements, or negative, e.g., by the imposition of
restrictions on other land.” Id. (quoting ENGLISH EXPERT COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION
AND BETTERMENT, FINAL REPORT, ¶ 260, Cmd. No. 6386 (1942).
187. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 130 (rejecting concept of conceptual severance
because “‘[t]aking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated”).
188. See id. at 124, 133 (stating that regulations may have “a more severe impact on some
landowners than on others, but that in itself does not mean that the law effects a ‘taking’”
because governments can promote the public welfare through “adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life . . . .”).
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government’s sudden decision to deny them services reduced the value of
their land and interfered with their reasonable investment-backed expectations.
Coastal claimants could also distinguish their case from Penn Central on
the basis that if basic services were withdrawn from their communities, they
would no longer be able to use their property in the same manner that it had
previously been used.189 Furthermore, coastal claimants would be deprived
of reasonable profits from the use of their property; a benefit retained by the
plaintiff in Penn Central despite the city’s law.190
The shortcoming of coastal claimants’ arguments is that the Supreme
Court has been unwilling to find takings in circumstances where a statute may
have adversely affected the landowner’s future intentions.191 Coastal claimants’ arguments are further weakened if the government can convince a court
that public policy is fluid and always evolving in a democratic society.
Because the world is not static, public policy must always be ready to adapt
to new circumstances and needs. Citizens, including landowners, are aware
that the benefits and burdens of society can be adjusted by governments to
serve the public welfare.192 Based on this knowledge and awareness, plaintiffs should not be permitted to claim that the denial of services interfered
with their reasonable investment-backed expectations.
In a narrow sense, the government could also argue that its denial of
basic services did not prevent people from using their land. Plaintiffs could
still inhabit their land, build on their land, and enjoy their land, regardless of
whether services were provided. The government would contend that these
rights, which were unaffected by the denial of services, represent the core
bundle of property rights. Additionally, nothing would prevent landowners
from paying a private entity to provide the services that had been withdrawn
by the government.
c. The Nature of the Government Action
As long as the government acts reasonably and in good faith in withdrawing basic services from a coastal community, most courts would likely
find that the nature of the government’s action did not constitute a taking.
Thus, the burden would fall upon coastal claimants to demonstrate that the
nature of the withdrawal of basic services went beyond merely “adjusting the

189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. at 136.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 133.
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benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”193 In
certain circumstances, coastal claimants may have a compelling argument
that the ultimate goal of the government’s denial of basic services and refusal
to rebuild infrastructure was to depress the real estate market in order to
compel landowners to sell their property at reduced prices that were
favorable for government acquisition. This argument is plausible because
some governments could view the withdrawal of basic services as a means to
circumvent the expenses of takings claims and acquire valuable property for
public purposes. In these situations, the “underlying fairness rationale” 194
that is explicit in the Takings Clause would be violated because coastal
landowners would be unfairly saddled with burdens that ought to be shared
collectively by the public.
Some state and federal courts have developed the term “condemnation
blight” to describe government actions aimed at reducing property values
before formal eminent domain proceedings are instituted.195 Courts have
shown a willingness to compensate plaintiffs where condemnation blight
occurs, even when a piece of property is not formally taken.196
Actions that may suggest condemnation blight include “the published
threat of condemnation, mailing letters and circulars concerning the project
to area residents, refusing to issue building permits for improvements coupled

193. Id. at 124.
194. Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 293 (2001).
195. W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. Town of Southampton, 351 F. Supp.2d 18, 26, 27 (E.D. N.Y.
2004). Condemnation blight often occurred in the City of New York when the:
Mayor or his office would make a public pronouncement of the City’s plan to renew
a deteriorated or slum area, then wait for a number of months for all business and
other interests to vacate the area and thereafter file condemnation papers claiming the
latter date to be the effective one, with greatly reduced values as a the fair value of the
property.
Id. at 26.
196. Id.; see also Richmond Elks Hall Ass’n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561
F.2d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a taking occurred despite Agency’s decision
to not acquire plaintiff’s land because “[a]gency’s interference with Elks' property rights was
direct and substantial, and that the result of this interference was a significant reduction in
the value of the subject property”); Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 143, 147 (6th
Cir. 1968) (affirming district court’s award of compensation to plaintiff where city
commenced condemnation activities and then discontinued such activities ten years later);
Friendship Cemetery v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 90 A.2d 695, 703 (Md. 1952)
(holding that plaintiff’s allegations that city’s bad faith precondemnation actions, which had
led several people to remove bodies from cemetery and discouraged others from purchasing
lots, raised question of fact for jury); In re Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 280 N.W.2d 574, 576,
577 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming jury award of compensation to landowner whose
property’s value was substantially decreased by condemnation blight caused by board of
education).
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with intense building violation inspection, reductions in city services to the
area and protracted delay and piecemeal condemnation and razing.”197 Other
courts have developed a de facto takings analysis that applies in “exceptional
circumstances which substantially deprive him [the landowner] of the use and
enjoyment of the property and such deprivation is the immediate consequence
of the condemnor’s power.”198 The rationale set forth in condemnation blight
cases could be used persuasively by coastal claimants in situations where the
government’s actions manifested an intention to substantially reduce coastal
property values for the purposes of government acquisition.
The inquiry as to the nature of the government’s actions is fact specific
and would vary with each takings case. Nevertheless, the nature of the
government’s actions would most likely be deemed appropriate in instances
where the government had a reasonable purpose or legitimate justification for
their actions. A government that withdrew basic services as a means to avoid
future storm-related expenditures and protect human life and property would
likely pass this deferential test.
Additionally, the government must retain the flexibility to respond to
changing external factors like climate change and the will of the people. If
courts upheld coastal claimants’ takings claims, landowners would forever be
entitled to services and governments’ public policy would be fixed in time.
Although this would protect landowners it would undermine democratic
government.
F. Takings Conclusion
Although fact specific, most coastal claimants’ takings claims against the
government for the withdrawal of basic services and refusal to rebuild
damaged infrastructure would be unsuccessful.199 Coastal claimants’

197. In re Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 280 N.W.2d at 576.
198. Pa. Dep’t of Transp. v. Difurio, 555 A.2d 1379, 1381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Although a government's withdrawal of basic services from the coast is unlikely to
require compensation to landowners under the Takings Clause, the government’s new public
policy would likely have certain political costs. In order for the government to discontinue
basic services to residents in a coastal community, notice would likely be a minimum
prerequisite. Providing people living within these coastal communities with a warning of
a future change in public policy would likely comport with the public’s sense of fairness and
compassion. Notice is associated with a fair opportunity for those living in a vulnerable
coastal community to leave. Most importantly, notice suggests that people have a choice and
from that choice derives personal responsibility.
Notice represents a political cost to the government’s new public policy direction
because it requires a certain amount of time to elapse before the intended public policy
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strongest contentions for takings claims would arise under theories of
substantial interference, interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and improper government motive. Intuitively, it seems unfair
that longtime coastal landowners could be left to fend for themselves after a
sudden withdrawal of basic services without any compensation. From a legal
standpoint, however, courts have granted the government deference to craft
public policy even if this happens to change peoples’ property rights.
The possibilities are endless as to the ways in which a court could try to
align these coastal takings cases with more traditional takings jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court may adopt a new rule or reemphasize a preexisting rule.
Nevertheless, the nature of the government action, as articulated in Penn
Central, would appear to be central to the outcome of cases under these
circumstances. If the government appears to be using its public policy as a
backdoor means to acquire property at a reduced price, a court would likely
hold that this constituted a taking. If, however, the government is merely
altering its public policy in reaction to new external circumstances for the
benefit of the public welfare, a court would be less inclined to find a taking.
V. CONCLUSION
Our society is on the verge of a new era in which our conception of the
American coastline is likely to change. Financial opportunities, insurance
subsidies, and “advancements” in shoreline technology have encouraged
massive population growth along the American coastline. Society has
created its own “perfect storm” in which a flood or hurricane can inflict
devastating and disproportionate harm on a community. Although society
has absorbed the costs of coastal communities, climate change and the
corresponding costs will serve as the impetus for the development of a new
coastal community ethic. This ethic will likely internalize the personal and
societal costs of maintaining coastal communities and serve as the catalyst for
public policy reform.
State and local governments have only a limited number of ways in
which they can respond to the coastal community crisis; they can either: (1)
provide the aid necessary to rebuild a community; or (2) they can develop a

becomes effective. Most notice provisions would likely require governments to cover the
costs of rebuilding coastal communities for at least one disaster cycle. Thus, if the
government enacted a notice provision immediately following a storm, it would still be
responsible for the costs associated with the current disaster.
In some states or municipalities, it may be necessary for the government to provide
housing subsidies, job training assistance, and other support services to help those
individuals who were affected by the government’s new public policy.
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new conception of the coast. Both economic and political factors in the near
future suggest that the government will choose the latter option. The
government’s new public policy direction would have political, rather than
legal, costs associated with its implementation. With few exceptions, most
coastal claimants’ takings claims against the government for the withdrawal
of basic services would be unsuccessful. Governments’ ability to withdraw
basic services from coastal communities has potentially far reaching implications that could redefine the American coastline. A mass exodus along the
coast could transpire thereby creating numerous possibilities for the way in
which coastal lands could be used. The decentralization of populations along
the coast could have a significant environmental impact.
Although zoning ordinances, provisions of the NFIA, and environmental
regulations represent the traditional tools that have been used to manage
coastal communities, this takings analysis suggests another means to regulate
coastal communities. States’ adoption of a coastal approach that withdraws
services from coastal communities will achieve the desired goal of aggressive
zoning ordinances and environmental regulations while avoiding legal costs.
The withdrawal of services from the coast further provides a powerful
disincentive for people to live along the coast. This approach has the
potential to break the coastal community lifecycle, save lives, conserve
limited resources, and protect coastal environments.

